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Abstract
Use of artificial intelligence is growing and expanding into
applications that impact people’s lives. People trust their
technology without really understanding it or its limitations.
There is the potential for harm and we are already seeing ex-
amples of that in the world. AI researchers have an obligation
to consider the impact of intelligent applications they work
on. While the ethics of AI is not clear-cut, there are guidelines
we can consider to minimize the harm we might introduce.
Introduction
A quick scan of recent papers covering the area of
AI and ethics reveals researchers’ admirable im-
pulse to think about teaching intelligent agents hu-
man values (Abel, MacGlashan, and Littman 2016;
Burton, Goldsmith, and Mattei 2016;
Riedl and Harrison 2016). There is, however, another
important and more immediate aspect of AI and ethics
we ought to take into consideration. AI is being widely
deployed for new applications; it’s becoming pervasive; and
it’s having an effect on people’s lives. AI researchers should
reflect on their own personal responsibility with regard to
the work they do. Many of us are motivated by the idea that
we can contribute useful new technology that has a positive
impact on the world. Positive outcomes have largely been
the case with advanced technologies that improve cancer
diagnosis and provide safety features in cars, for example.
With vast amounts of computing power and a number of
improved techniques, intelligent software is being adopted
in more and more contexts that affect people’s lives. How
people use it is starting to matter, and the impact of our
decisions matters.
Not surprisingly as the use of AI expands, negative con-
sequences of its failures and design flaws are more visible.
Much of the AI that has recently been deployed derives its
intelligence from learning algorithms that are based on sta-
tistical analysis of data. The acquisition, applicability, and
analysis of that data determine its output. Statistics shine
when making predictions about distributions over popula-
tions. That predictive power fades when applied to individu-
als. There will be faulty predictions. The popular press is rife
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with misuses of statistical analysis and AI (Crawford 2016;
O’Neil 2016). Given the growing use, the built-in uncertain-
ties, and the public’s tendency to blindly trust technology,
we have a responsibility to consider the likely and unlikely
outcomes of the choices we make when we are designing
and developing tools or predictive systems to support deci-
sion making that affect people and communities of people.
Purposely malicious choices are obviously ethically un-
acceptable. In (Yampolskiy 2015), the author outlines var-
ious pathways that lead to dangerous artificial intelligence.
Within the taxonomy, there are pathways that introduce dan-
ger into artificial intelligence ‘on purpose.’ The other path-
ways inadvertently lead to hazards in the system. You can
decide for yourself if you are comfortable developing smart
weapons, for example, and most of us would, at a minimum,
pause to consider the implications of that decision. But the
inadvertent pathways leading to dangerous AI can be diffi-
cult to foresee and may come about from subtle interactions.
Our less obvious responsibility lies in giving careful consid-
eration to our choices and being clear to ourselves and our
stakeholders about assumptions, trade-offs, and choices we
make.
Several other papers consider another ethical as-
pect in the fairness of automatic systems (O’Neil 2016;
Hardt, Price, and Srebro 2016; NSTCCT 2016), and some
even conclude that it’s inherently impossible for most prob-
lems (Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan 2016). One
of the points I’ll make is that discussions about fairness and
societal impact can be cut off once an intelligent agent is
introduced into the process. There is a popular feeling that
machines don’tmake value judgments and are inherently un-
biased. However, the assumptions we make when design-
ing our systems are often based on subjective value judg-
ments; for example, choosing data sets, selecting weight-
ing schemes, balancing precision and recall. We have to be
transparent about what we do and be clear about the choices
we have made. The ultimate purpose matters and the deci-
sions you come to must be communicated.
Blind Trust in Technology
Although there are pockets of skepticism towards intelligent
systems, by and large people are content to offload decisions
to technology. In May 2016, there was a widely publicized
crash involving a Tesla Motors car being driven in computer-
assisted mode. It appears the driver had undue faith in the ca-
pabilities of the car (Habib 2017). The following week an-
other driver following a GPS unit steered her car into On-
tario’s Georgian Bay (MiQuigge 2016). These extreme ex-
amples reveal a trend in the general population to trust the
smart devices in our lives.
Ideally government agencies and jurisdictions would ap-
ply the principles of open government and transparency
when contracting with suppliers for decision-making tools.
In practice that hasn’t been the case. Last year, two re-
searchers filed 42 open records requests in 23 different
states asking for information about software with predic-
tive algorithms used by governments as decision support
tools (Brauneis and Goodman 2017). Their goal was to un-
derstand the policies built into the algorithms in order to
evaluate their usefulness and fairness. Only one of the ju-
risdictions was able to provide information about the algo-
rithms the software used and how it was developed. Some
of those who did not respond cited agreements with vendors
preventing them from revealing information, but many did
not seem concerned about transparency in their process nor
the need to understand the technology. Assuming the best
intentions of the decision makers, they are also demonstrat-
ing great faith in the technology and vendors they contract
with.
There is also evidence that users of these systems, judges
and hiring managers for example, weight AI guidance too
heavily. Without tools, when people are making decisions,
there is public awareness that decisions are made within
some context. We understand that individuals can be influ-
enced even subconsciously by their biases and prejudices.
Technologically assisted decisions tend to shut down the
conversation about fairness despite their having a large ef-
fect on people’s lives. Those affected may not have the op-
portunity to contest the decisions. If important decisions are
made through our models, we must use care in developing
them and clearly communicate the assumptions we make.
Ethical Obligations
Physicians and attorneys have well-established codes of
ethics. Doctors famously commit to not doing any harm. Im-
plied in that concept is the idea that there is potential to do
harm. It is clear from many examples, some of which I men-
tion in this paper, that there is the potential for harm in our
work, and given people’s lack of understanding of the lim-
its of and the trust they place in technology, AI researchers
have a personal, ethical obligation to reflect on the decisions
we make.
Ethical thinking helps us to make choices and just as
importantly provides a framework to reason about those
choices. The framework we use (explicitly or not) is defined
by a set of principles that guide and support our decisions.
One of the difficult things about defining ethical standards
is deciding the values to base them on. Ethics issues will
undoubtedly be discussed and argued within the community
and the world generally in the coming years. Each of us can
start by considering our own roles and being consciously
aware of the effects our work can have.
The stakeholders who decide to deploy intelligent deci-
sion making, government agencies for example, generally
aren’t qualified to assess the assumptions, models and algo-
rithms in it. This asymmetrical relationship puts the burden
on those with the information to be clear, honest, and forth-
coming with it. Those at a disadvantage depend on us to
inform them about technology’s fitness for their purpose, its
reliability and accuracy. We usually focus on the technical
aspects of our work like selecting highly predictive models
and minimizing error functions, but when applying algorith-
mic decision-making that will affect human beings, we have
a responsibility to think about more.
Recommendations for Consideration
Ethics is not science. But it is possible to ground our think-
ing in well-defined guidelines to assist in making ethical
decisions for AI development. A formal framework may
even emerge within the researcher community with time. In
the short-term, the following is a list of thoughts and ques-
tions to ask ourselves when designing predictive or decision-
making systems.
1. Relevance of data and models
It is important to think carefully about the data used to train
our technology. Are the data and models appropriate to the
real-life problem they are solving? It is tempting to believe
causal forces are at play when we find correlation on a single
dataset. Does the data capture the true variable of interest? Is
it consistent across observations and over time?We often in-
troduce a proxy variable because the variable we need isn’t
available or isn’t easy to quantify. Can your findings be cal-
ibrated against the real-world situation? Even better could
you measure the actual outcome you’re trying to achieve?
In 2008, Researchers at Google had the idea that an in-
crease in search queries related to the flu and flu symp-
toms could be indicative of a spreading virus. They created
the Google Flu Trends (GFT) web service to track Google
users’ search queries related to the flu. If they detected in-
creased transmission before the numbers from the U.S. Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) came out,
earlier interventions could reduce the impact of the virus.
The initial article reported 97% accuracy using the CDC
data as the gold standard (Ginsberg et al. 2009). However,
a follow-up report showed that in subsequent flu seasons
GFT predicted more than double what the CDC data showed
(Lazer et al. 2014). Given the first year’s high accuracy, it
would have been easy for the researchers to believe they had
discovered a strong, predictive signal. But online behavior
isn’t necessarily a reflection of the real world. There are
several factors that might make the GFT data wrong. One
of them is that the underlying algorithms of Google Search
itself (the GFT researchers don’t control those) can change
from one year to the next. Also users’ search behavior could
have changed. Mainly, however, people’s search patterns are
probably not a good single indicator of a spreading virus.
There are many other factors and various reasons people
might search for information.
Training data rarely aligns with real-life goals. In
(Lipton 2016), Lipton presents challenges to providing and
even defining interpretability of machine learning outputs.
He identifies several possible points of divergence between
training data and real-life situations. For example, off-line
training data is not always representative of the true environ-
ment, and real-world objectives can be difficult to encode as
simple value functions. Often we work with data that was
collected for other purposes and almost never under ideal,
controlled circumstances. What was the original purpose in
collecting the data, and how did that determine its content?
In July of 2015, another group at Google had to apologize
for its Photos application identifying a black couple as goril-
las (Guynn 2015). Their training dataset was not representa-
tive of the population it was meant to predict. Also, there are
limits to the amount of generalization we can expect from
any learning method trained on a particular dataset.
Is it possible your dataset contains biases? When mak-
ing decisions related to hiring, judicial proceedings, and
job performance, for example, many personal characteris-
tics are legally excluded. Also, humans are good at dis-
carding variables they recognize as irrelevant to the deci-
sion to be made; computers are blind to those considera-
tions. Are there other characteristics that are closely corre-
lated with legally and ethically protected ones? If you don’t
consider those, you can inadvertently treat people unfairly
based on protected or irrelevant characteristics. There is of-
ten a trade-off between accuracy and the intelligibility of a
model (Caruana et al. 2015). More predictive but harder-to-
understand models can make it difficult to know which per-
sonal characteristics determine the decision and are there-
fore not available for validation against human judgment.
In (Caruana et al. 2015) the authors describe a system that
learned a rule that patients with a history of asthma have a
lower risk of dying from pneumonia. Based on the data used
to train the system, their model was absolutely correct. How-
ever, in reality asthma sufferers (without treatment) have a
higher risk of dying from pneumonia. Because of the in-
creased risk, when patients with a history of asthma go to
the hospital, the general practice is to place them in an in-
tensive care unit. The extra attention they receive decreases
their risk of dying from pneumonia even below that of the
general population. It is our natural inclination to develop
models with the highest accuracy. However, the necessity of
visibility into decisions where people’s lives are concerned,
may increase the importance of explainability at the expense
of some predictive performance. In all cases, our stakehold-
ers must understand the decisions we make and the trade-
offs implied by them.
2. Safeguards for Failures and Misuse
Even experienced researchers with the best intentions are
inclined to favor the positive outcomes of their work. We
highlight positive results, but we should also think through
failure modes and possible unintended consequences. What
about misuse? There isn’t a lot you can do about a person de-
termined to use the technology in ways it wasn’t intended,
but are there ways a good-faith user might go wrong? Can
you add protections for that?
The 2016 Tesla accident mentioned before was catas-
trophic. The driver used computer-assisted mode in condi-
tions it was expressly not designed for resulting in his death.
The accident was investigated by two government agencies.
The first finding from the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration found that the driver-assist software
had no safety defects and declared that, in general, the ve-
hicles performed as designed (Habib 2017) implying that
responsibility for use of the system falls on the operator.
A later investigation from The National Transportation and
Safety Board found otherwise (NTSB 2016). They declared
that the automatic controls played a major role in the crash.
The fact that the driver was able to use computer assistance
in a situation it was not intended for was problematic. The
combination of human error and insufficient safeguards re-
sulted in an accident that should not have happened.
3. Accuracy
How accurate is your algorithm and how accurate does it
need to be? Do your stakeholders understand the number of
people who will be subject to a missed prediction given your
measure of accuracy? A model that misses only 1% shows
phenomenally good performance, but if hundreds or thou-
sands of people are still adversely affected, that might not
be acceptable. Are there human inputs that can compensate
for the system’s misses and can you design for that? What
about post-deployment accuracy? Accuracy in training data
doesn’t always reflect real usage. Do you have a way to mea-
sure runtime accuracy? The world is dynamic and changes
with time. Is there a way to continue to assess the accuracy
after release? How often does it have to be reviewed?
4. Size and severity of impact
Think about the numbers of people affected. Of course, you
want to avoid harming anyone but knowing the size or the
severity of negative consequences can justify the cost of ex-
tra scrutiny. You might also be able to design methods that
mitigate for them. Given an understanding of the impact,
you can make better decisions about the value required by
the extra effort.
Conclusion
Individual researchers, especially in commercial operations,
don’t always have the chance to communicate clearly and
transparently with clients. At least being transparent with
your immediate stakeholders can set the right expectations
for them when they represent your work down the line. You
are necessarily making decisions about the models and soft-
ware you develop. If you don’t surface those decisions to
discuss their effect, they may never be brought to light.
A short paper cannot cover such a large and multi-faceted
issue. The main idea is for each of us to think individually
about our own responsibilities and the impact our work can
have on real lives. It’s useful to spend time thinking about
our assumptions and the trade-offs we make in the context
of the people who will be affected. Communicating those to
everyone concerned is also critical. Modern versions of the
Hippocratic Oath are still used by many medical schools.
The spirit of the oath is applicable to most research affecting
human beings. One phrase is especially general and worth
keeping in mind:
“I will remember that I remain a member of society,
with special obligations to all my fellow human be-
ings. . . ” (Tyson 2001)
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